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FOREWORD
This is one of a set of seven reports, each one describing the
results, for a particular subsystem, of a study titled "An Engineering
Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques. " Under the general title of
"A Guide to Onboard Checkout," the reports are as follows.
IBM Number
71W-00308
71W-00309
71W-00310
71W-00311
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71W-00313
71W-00314
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Guidance, Navigation and Control
Environmental Control and Life
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Electrical Power
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Data Management
Structures/Mechanical
R. F. Communications
This set of guides was prepared from the results of a nine month
"Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques" (NAS9-11189)
performed under NASA contract by the IBM Federal Systems Division
at its Space Systems facility in Huntsville, Alabama, with the support
of the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company Western Division,
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Technical monitor for the study was Mr. L. Marion Pringle, Jr.
of the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center. The guidance and support
given to the study by him and by other NASA personnel are gratefully
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE
With the advent of large scale aerospace systems, designers have recognized
the importance of specifying and meeting design requirements additional to the
classical functional and environmental requirements. These "additional" require-
ments include producibility, safety, reliability, quality, and maintainability.
These criteria have been identified, grown into prominence, and become disciplines
in their own right. Presently, it is inconceivable that any aerospace system/
equipment design requirements would be formulated without consideration of
these criteria.
The complexity, sophistication and duration of future manned space missions
demand that still another criterion needs to be considered in the formulation of
system/equipment requirements. The concept of "checkoutability" denotes the
adaptability of a system, subsystem, or equipment to a controlled checkout pro-
cess. As with other requirements, it should also apply from the time of early
design concept formulation.
The results of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques" and
other studies indicate that for an extended space mission onboard checkout is
mandatory and applicable to all subsystems of the space system. In order to use
it effectively, "checkoutability" should be incorporated into the design of each
subsystem, beginning with initial performance requirements.
Conferences with researchers, system engineers and subsystem specialists
in the course of the basic Onboard Checkout Techniques Study revealed an extensive
interest in the idea of autonomous onboard checkout. Designers are motivated to
incorporate "checkoutability" into their subsystem designs but express a need for
information and guidance that will enable them to do so efficiently.
It is the objective of this report to present the results of the basic study as
they relate to one space subsystem to serve as a guide, by example, to those who
in the future need to implement onboard checkout in a similar subsystem. It is not
practicable to formulate a firm set of instructions or recipes, because operational
requirements, which vary widely among systems, normally determine the check-
out philosophy. It is suggested that the reader study this report as a basis from
which to build his own approach to "checkoutability."
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1.2 BASIC STUDY SUMMARY
1.2.1 STUDY OBJECTIVE
The basic study was aimed at identification and evaluation of techniques for
achieving the following capabilities in the operational Space Station/Base, under
control of the Data Management System (DMS), with minimal crew intervention.
· Automated failure prediction and detection
· Automated fault isolation
· Failure correction
* Onboard electronic maintenance
1.2.2 STUDY BASELINE
The study started in July 1970. The system design baseline was established
by the Space Station Phase B study results as achieved by the McDonnell-Douglas/
IBM team, modified in accordance with technical direction from NASA-MSC. The
overall system configuration was the 33-foot diameter, four-deck, 12-man station.
Individual subsystem baseline descriptions are given in their respective "Guide to
Onboard Checkout" reports.
1.2.3 STUDY TASKS
The basic study comprised five tasks. Primary emphasis was given to
Task 1, Requirements Analysis and Concepts. This task established subsystem
baseline descriptions and then analyzed them to determine their reliability/main-
tainability characteristics (criticality, failure modes and effects, maintenance
concepts and line replaceable unit (LRU) definitions), checkout strategies, test
definitions, and definitions of stimuli and measurements. After software pre-
liminary designs were available, an analysis of checkout requirements on the DMS
was performed.
A software task was performed to determine the software requirements
dictated by the results of Task 1.
Task 3 was a study of onboard electronic maintenance requirements and
recommendations of concepts to satisfy them. Supporting research and technology
tasks leading to an onboard maintenance capability were identified. The study
implementation plan and recommendations for implementing results of the study
were developed in Task 4. The task final report also summarizes results of the
study in all technical tasks.
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Reliability, Task 5, was very limited in scope, resulting in an analysis of
failure modes and effects in three Space Station subsystems, GN&C, DMS (computer
group) and RF communications.
1.2.4 PREVIOUS REPORTS
Results of the basic study were reported by task in the following reports,
under the general title of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques,
Final Report. "
IBM Number Title
71W-00111
71W-00112
71W-00113
71W-00114
71W-00115
Task 1: Requirements Analysis and Concepts
Task 2: Software
Task 3: Onboard Maintenance
Task 4: Summary and Recommendations
Task 5: Subsystem Level Failure Modes and
Effects
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Section 2
BASELINE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
2.1 GENERAL
This section describes the baseline Electrical Power Subsystem which was
analyzed to define onboard checkout requirements. In order to assess require-
ments for onboard checkout, descriptions at the subsystem level and the assembly
level are required, as well as the major interfaces between subsystems.
The assembly level description for each of the subsystems (MSFC-DRL-160,
Line Item 13) provided the primary working document for subsystem analysis. To
reduce documentation, these documents have been incorporated by reference into
this report, where applicable. Therefore, where no significant differences exist
from the Phase B definition, this report contains a brief subsystem description
and an identification of the referenced document containing the assembly level
descriptions for that subsystem. Where significant differences do exist, the sub-
system level description includes these changes in as much detail as is available.
MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 19, provided the major subsystem interface descrip-
tions for analysis of integrated test requirements.
2.2 SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION
The function of the Electrical Power Subsystem is to generate, condition,
control, and distribute electrical power to the Space Station power-consuming
subsystems.
This section describes the isotope/Brayton cycle EPS and specifies its
characteristics, design parameters, and overall performance.
The Electrical Power Subsystem consists of four major subassembly
groups:
* Power Source Assembly Group
* Energy Storage Assembly
* Power System Management Assembly
* Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution Assembly Group
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The Isotope/Brayton Power System employs radiative transfer from the
isotope heat source array to the Brayton cycle heat exchanger. This arrange-
ment permits Power Conversion System (PCS) module replacement without cutting
high temperature lines. The central element is the PCS-heat exchanger module,
which has been designed not only for long system lifetime, but also to allow rapid
changeout of a failed module.
The output of the power source assembly group is 29. 8 kWe of 1200-Hz,
120/208-vac, three-phase electrical power, with 14. 9 kWe provided by each PCS.
The electrical power is delivered to separate source buses, which represent the
initial elements of the transmission, conditioning, and distribution assembly
group.
The energy storage assembly provides stored energy for following the
variable vehicle power loading while maintaining constant Brayton cycle power
loading, provides emergency power for a minimum of 1 hour for crew escape
or Station reactivation, and provides initial power for Station activation.
The power management assembly provides control and display functions
for all EPS assemblies and interfaces with the Central Control Stations, the Data
Management Subsystem, and the Onboard Checkout System.
In addition to the 29. 8 kWe total of electrical power, which corresponds
to 25 kWe average available at the ac and dc load buses, 4. 0 kWt of thermal
power (2. 0 kWt from each heat source) is extracted as waste heat at 250 F for
use by the EC/LS Subsystem. Consequently, the equivalent rating of the I/Br
EPS is 25 kWe plus 4 kWe, or 29 kW at the load buses. This performance is
uniquely available from this system.
The heat source is a Pu-238 isotope IRV radiantly coupled to a Brayton
Cycle Conversion System generating 14. 9 kWe at the alternator terminals after
losses for PCS control, monitoring, and pumping.
Thermodynamic energy not converted to electricity is transferred from
the Xe-He Brayton cycle working fluid to a recirculating FC-75 liquid radiator
loop through a heat rejection heat exchanger. The mechanical losses of the
Combined Rotating Unit (CRU) and the generator losses are transferred to a
parallel cooling loop through a separate heat exchanger.
Conversion of thermal power to electrical power is performed by a re-
cuperated Brayton cycle loop using a single-shaft CRU with a Rice alternator
operating at 36, 000 rpm. The indicated performance and state point conditions
are established by the operating temperature ratio (heat sink heat exchanger
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temperature versus heat source heat exchanger temperature), and the projected
PCS performance is based on extrapolation of Brayton B engine test data. PCS
parasitic losses (pump and electrical power control) are deducted from the al-
ternator output. The overall system efficiency of 25. 8 percent is based on iso-
tope heat production (end-of-life) and power available at the electrical load bus
for subsystems and experiments.
2.3 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTION
Descriptions of the Electrical Power Subsystem assembly groups and
assemblies are provided in the Space Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13,
Volume I, Book 1, Electrical Power. These descriptions include discussions
of the assembly groups and assemblies, physical characteristics, block diagrams
and drawings, and design characteristics. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, is in-
corporated by reference into this report as a detailed description of the Electrical
Power Subsystem assembly groups and assemblies and will become the primary
working document for further analysis.
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Section 3
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES
3.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
As a guide to emphasis in subsequent checkout technique studies, an analysis
has been made of the overall subsystem and major component criticality (failure
probability) of the Space Station subsystems and equipment. As an input to the
Checkout Requirements Analysis Task, this data along with the failure mode and
effects data will be useful in determining test priorities and test scheduling.
Additionally, this data will aid in optimizing checkout system design to ensure
that confidence of failure detection is increased in proportion to added system
complexity and cost.
3.1.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
A criticality number (related to failure probability) was generated for each
major subsystem component. This number is the product of: (1) the component
failure rate (or the reciprocal of mean-time-between-failure), (2) the component's
anticipated usage or duty cycle, and (3) an orbital time period of six months, or
4, 380 hours. Six months was chosen as the time period of interest to allow one
missed resupply on the basis of normal resupply occurring at three-month intervals.
The criticality number, then, is the failure expectation for a particular component
over any six-month time period.
For visibility, the major components of each subsystem analyzed have been
ordered according to the magnitude of their criticality numbers. This number,
however, should not be considered as an indication of the real risk involved, since
it does not take into account such factors as redundant components, subsystem
maintainability, and the alternate operational procedures available.
Overall subsystem criticality has been determined by a computerized
optimization process whereby spares and redundancy are considered in terms of
a trade-off between increased reliability and weight. This determination, there-
fore, reflects not only the failure probability of subsystem components, but also
the probability that a spare or redundant component may not be available to
restore the subsystem to operational status. The methodology used is described
in Section 9, Long-Life Assurance Study Results, DRL 13 (Preliminary Subsystem
Design Data), Volume III (Supporting Analyses), Book 4 (Safety/Long Life/Test
Philosophy) from the MDAC Phase B Space Station Study. Component-level failure
mode and criticality data are presented in subsequent paragraphs.
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3.1.2 ELECTRICAL POWER
The optimized six-month reliability for the Electrical Power Subsystem
(EPS) is 0. 997 and requires 1,300 pounds of spares for its achievement. An
ordered ranking of EPS component criticality is provided in Table 3-1.
3.2 FAILURE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Based upon the baseline subsystem descriptions, each major subsystem
component was assessed to determine its most probable failure mode(s), and
the "mission effect" associated with this failure mode(s). The "mission effect"
is noted to provide a brief explanation of Space Station behavior if the particular
failure mode should occur (e. g., experiments degraded, crew hazard, etc. ). The
explanation generally does not consider the offsetting effects of backup redundancy
or spares since there would be practically no effect if these factors were con-
sidered.
In addition, the effect of failure is categorized into the following criticality
classes:
(a) Category I - Failure could cause a loss of life.
(b) Category II - Failure could cause the loss of a primary mission
objective.
(c) Category III - Failure could cause the loss of a secondary mission
objective.
(d) Category IV - Failure results in only a nuisance.
In most cases, Category II and Category III failures are not distinguishable
because primary and secondary mission objectives have not been identified to the
level of detail required to permit such separation.
The EPS failure mode analysis deviates somewhat from that conducted on
other subsystems. This was necessary because many failures will only cause
temporary loss of up to 12. 5 kw, and then only if the batteries were not fully
charged. For this reason the "mission effects" column presents the actual effects
on the total EPS system, considering backup. Most failures are placed in
Category II which means that experiments could be temporarily curtailed if repair
is not accomplished in a reasonable time.
Table 3-2 presents a partial listing of failure modes and criticality classi-
fication data which should serve as a useful example.
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3.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT ANALYSIS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment.
3.3.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
General considerations governing maintenance philosophy in the Space Station
are discussed in Section 7. Specific applications to the Electrical Power Sub-
system are discussed in the next subsection.
3.3.2 EPS MAINTENANCE
The major maintenance activity for the Electrical Power Subsystem is
associated with circuit breakers, switches, inverters, battery chargers, voltage
regulators, etc. These are replaceable items, and also contain replaceable
function modules, such as electronic circuit cards. Provisions are made for
switching in spare voltage regulators, battery chargers, etc., to permit main-
tenance or replacement at connector plugs as required, except where flat wire
circuits are used in consoles. The inverters, voltage regulators and battery
chargers are bolted to cold plates using allen-head-type bolts and will require
closely-controlled flat surfaces for contact to assure heat transfer.
Two spare power conversion systems (PCS) for the two operating PCSs of the
Isotope/Brayton Electrical Power System are installed in the power module (part of
the core module), along with the remote handling mechanisms, carriages, and
closed circuit TV viewing links used for transferring the PCS during installation
or interchange. The PCS has a 2 1/2-year design life. PCS exchange can be
performed either remotely or locally; however, work in this unpressurized com-
partment must be accomplished in a space suit. The isotope reentry vehicle,
including the heat source (HS), must be placed in the passive heat dump mode for
dissipation of HS energy to space during the PCS transfer. IRV deployment for
heat dumping is accomplished by rotation of the IRV hinge mechanism and IRV
support ring out of the Space Station port and away from the heat source heat
exchanger (HSHX) into a position 90 degrees (or more) away from the radiator in
which it is cooled by radiation to space. The IRV/heat source is held in operating
position by solenoid-operated shear pins which are positively retracted during the
deployment sequence. (Subsequent to launch if PCS power is lost, the pins fail in
a retracted position. )
In the event of an abort or to release the IRV and heat source from the Space
Station for recovery, the shear pins are first released and the IRV/heat source is
moved to the deployed position by preloaded springs. Then the IRV/heat source is
removed from the Space Station at the hinge attachment to the support ring, using
a number of explosive (squib-actuated) nuts.
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When normal recovery by an advanced logistic system is to be accomplished,
a remote manipulator on the Crew Cargo/Tug Module will extract the deployed
IRV/heat source from the mounting and transfer it, first to the recovery support
cradle, and then to the ALS cargo door opening while still contained within the
recovery support cradle. All operations will be conducted to incur minimum
exposure to the crew from the unshielded IRV/heat source, using remotely con-
trolled manipulators and closed circuit TV observation.
3.4 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT ANALYSIS
General guidelines and criteria for the definition of LRUs were established
and these along with the maintenance philosophies reported in Section 7 were used
to determine at what level line maintenance would be performed. For the Space
Station Subsystems specific justification applicable to LRU selection for the par-
ticular subsystem under examination was derived from the guidelines and these
justifications are presented along with the LRU listing. The "functional LRUs"
were then considered in the light of the standard electronic packaging scheme and
actual LRUs were defined and listed. The method employed and the results
achieved are discussed in the following sections.
3.4. 1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
The definition of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) is keyed to repairing sub-
systems in an in-place configuration with the LRU being the smallest modular unit
suitable for replacement. General factors considered in identifying subsystem
LRUs include: (1) maintenance concepts developed and defined in Section 3. 3;
(2) the component-level failure rates delineated in the criticality analyses of
Section 3. 1; (3) the amount of crew time and skill required for fault isolation
and repair; (4) resultant DMS hardware and software complexity; and (5) subsystem
weight, volume, location, and interchangeability characteristics. Listings of LRUs
and more specific justification for their selection follows.
Discussion of the LRUs identified for the Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS)
is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with EPS transmission, condition-
ing, and distribution equipment, while the second addresses the Isotope/Brayton
System.
3. 4. 1. 1 Transmission, Conditioning, and Distribution
The EPS transmission/conditioning/distribution (T/C/D) LRUs are listed in
Table 3-3 andconsist of conductors, conductor terminations, relays, circuit
breakers, limiters (fuses), power conditioners, and power control and instru-
mentation elements.
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Table 3-3. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution
Quantity
LRU
Required Redundant
Alternator Feeders 2 2
Alternator Feeder Circuit Breakers 2
Alternator Feeder/Source Bus Differential 6
Protection Relays
Alternator Feeder/Source Bus Phase - Balance 2
Protection Relays
Source Bus to Distributor - No. 2 1200 Hz 2 2(2)
Transmission Cables
Distributor No. 2 to Distributor No. 1 - 1200 Hz 2 1(1)
Transmission Cables
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Differential 12
Protection Relays
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Phase-Balance 4
Protection Relays
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Current Breakers 8
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Power Switches 2
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Limiters (Fuses) 6
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Differential 12
Protection Relays
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Phase-Balance 2(2)
Protection Relays
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Power Switches 5
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Selector Switches 3
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Circuit Breakers 17 3
1200 Hz Feeders to Distribution Panels (Load Buses) 2 2
1200 Hz Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers 2 2
1200 Hz Load Line Circuit Breakers 
-10
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Differential Protection 4
Relays
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Table 3-3. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution (Continued)
Quantity
Required Redundant
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Bus Sectionalizing CBs
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Bus Power Switches
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Bus Reverse Current Relays
28 Vdc Bus Tie Cable
28 Vdc Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers
28 Vdc Feeders to Distribution Panels (Load Buses)
28 Vdc Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers
28 Vdc Load Line Circuit Breakers
260 Vdc Link Bus Differential Protection Relays
260 Vdc Link Bus Circuit Breakers
260 Vdc Link Bus Power Switches
260 Vdc Link Bus Reverse Current Relays
260 Vdc Bus Tie Cable
260 Vdc Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers
Main 400 Hz Distributor Bus Power Switches
400 Hz Square Wave Bus Tie Cable
400 Hz Square Wave Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers
400 Hz Square Wave Feeders to Distribution Panels
400 Hz Square Wave Distribution Feeder Circuit
Breakers
400 Hz Square Wave Load Line Circuit Breakers
400 Hz Sine Wave Bus Tie Cable
2
12
12'
1
2
10
10
~500
2
3
2
2
1
2
6(5)
1
2
12
12
.225
1
2(4)
2(4)
1(1)
8(4)
8(4)
_75
for essential
loads only
3(4)
2(4)
2(4)
1(1)
2(5)
1
4(4)
4(4)
- 20
1(1)
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LRU
Table 3-3. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution (Continued)
Quantity
LRU- Required Redundant
400 Hz Sine Wave Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers 2 -
400 Hz Sine Wave Feeders to Distribution Panels 12 4(4)
400 Hz Sine Wave Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers 12 4(4)
400 Hz Sine Wave Load Line Circuit Breakers -25 -20
Main 60 Hz Distributor Bus Power Switches (Single Pole) 2 -
60 Hz Bus Tie Cable (Single Phase) 1 - (1)
60 Hz Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breaker (Single Pole) 1 -
60 Hz Feeders to Distribution Panel (GPL Only) 1 1(2)
60 Hz Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers (GPL Only) _10
60 Hz Bus Sectionalizing and Load Line CBs (GPL Only) _10
600 Hz Starting Bus Circuit Breakers (Interlocked) 1 2
600 Hz Starting Bus Selector Switch ' 1 1
600 Hz Transmission Cable from M-G in Distribution 1 0
Center No. 1 to Starting Bus in Distributor Center No. 2
600 Hz Transmission Cable to Alternator No. 1 1 0
600 Hz Transmission Cable to Alternator No. 2 1 0
600 Hz Motor Generator (M-G) Set 1 1
Motor-Generator Input CBs (28 Vdc) 1 1
Regulated Transformer-Rectifiers (28 Vdc) 4 1 (4) (6)
High-Voltage Rectifier Regulator (260 Vdc) 2 2 (4) (6)
400 Hz Square Wave Inverter 1 1 (4) (6)
400 Hz Sine Wave Inverter 1 1 (4) (6)
60 Hz Sine Wave Inverter (Single Phase) 1 1 (4) (6)
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Table 3-3. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution (Continued)
LRU
Launch and Ascent/Emergency Inverter
(400 Hz Sine Wave)
Launch and Ascent/Emergency Inverter Input CBs
(28 Vdc)
Battery Charger Regulator
Battery
Battery Switching Unit
Buck Regulator (Regulates battery discharge voltage)
Battery Emergency Override Control Circuit Breaker
Power Control Modules (Power Management Assembly)
Instrumentation Sensors
Signal Conditioning Units
Quantity
Required Redundant
1 1 (6)
1 1
10
10
10
10
10
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
(1) Laid-in spare
(2) Operating redundancy
(3) Bus No. 2 only
(4) Standby redundancy
(5) Combined requirements for 400 Hz sine wave and square wave buses.
Includes two square wave sine wave bus tie switches interlocked with
outputs of emergency inverters.
(6) LRU may be at the component level in the noted modules.
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Main ac power feeder circuits are comprised of individual 4-conductor cables
having relatively large cross-sectional areas. Both single-cable and multiple-cable
circuits are employed. Spare cables complete with terminations are laid in place
ready for connection into selected circuits in the event of a conductor/cable failure.
This minimizes handling of large-gauge conductors and limits subsystem down time
to the affected power circuit.
Differential and reverse current relays, circuit breakers, and switches
(either electromechanical or solid state) are multiple usage items installed in
panels and other higher-level bussing assemblies. They are selected as LRUs
to reduce spares requirements and to minimize load circuit interruptions or
power curtailment for either scheduled or unscheduled replacements.
Power conditioners (transformer-rectifiers, inverters, buck regulators,
etc. ) are typically "black box" end items. On-line redundancy is employed in the
operation of these units. The T/C/D system is designed to permit quick replace-
ment of these items in order to maintain operating redundancy/system reliability
at required levels.
The design of power conditioning equipment generally lends itself to mod-
ularization and fault detection to the module level. Replacement of modules within
power conditioners should be considered as an alternate to the "black box" LRU
level where module commonality would permit economies-in-spares provisioning.
Typical LRUs for T/C/D instrumentation include sensors and signal con-
ditioners for status display and power protection and control. The uniqueness of
many T/C/D sensing devices in terms of location and rating (e.g., current trans-
formers in transmission circuits, as well as distribution circuits, with primary
ratings ranging from over 50 amperes to less than 1 ampere) establish these items
as LRUs. Selected logic, amplification and possibly computational modules
associated with power control are also candidate LRUs.
3. 4.1. 2 Isotope/Brayton LRUs
A listing of the isotope/Brayton LRUs is given in Table 3-4. Their selection
is predicated on nuclear safety, life, and reliability considerations. They are also
restricted to those assemblies and components which are readily replaceable and
which are within the purview of projected crew skills and available tooling.
Isotope recovery requirements for nuclear safety dictate that the complete
isotope reentry vehicle (IRV) heat source assembly be a line replaceable unit.
Radiation hazard prevents any subassembly or component within the IRV heat
source from being replaced. Therefore, all critical components and instrumen-
tation are installed with adequate on-line and standby redundancy or alternate
modes of operation to provide acceptable performance for the life of the IRV
heat source. Typical examples are: (1) the dual hinges that allow the IRV heat
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Table 3-4. Electrical Power Isotope/Brayton System
Quantity
LRU StandbyRequir ed Redundant
Isotope Reentry Vehicle Heat Source 2
Power Conversion System 2 1
Solenoid Valve Electrical Assembly 12 6
Insulation
Surface Thermocouple 26 13
Mounting Attachment TBD TBD
Heat Rejection System
Pump Motor 8
Transducers 44
Cold Plate 6
Diversion Valve 8
Pump Motor Electrical Switch 8
Insulation
Gas Management System
Heater Contactor 2
Gas Storage Bottle 2
Transducer 4
Solenoid Valve Electrical Assembly 10
Electronic Monitoring and Control Assembly
Signal Conditioner Module 2
Speed Control and Dissipative Load Bank Unit 2
Voltage Regulator Exciter 2
Shield Assembly
Shield 2
Shield Retraction Cable 2
Shield Retraction Sheave 2
Shield Retraction Drive 2
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source to open on either side for emergency cooling; and (2) the critical heat
source temperature instrumentation having triple redundant sensors at both the
capsule and on the BeO heat sink.
The Brayton Power Conversion System (PCS) is hermetically sealed for
operation in the space environment. The complete PCS is replaceable as well as
those PCS components that do not require the opening of working fluid lines. Re-
placeable components are therefore limited to surface thermocouples, solenoid
valve electrical assemblies, and mounting fixtures. Replacement of internal com-
ponents; e.g., rotating unit, heat exchangers, pressure gauges, and valve bodies,
would require cutting and welding lines that operate at high temperatures and
pressure. Extensive inspection, testing, and gas recharging would also be
required before the system could be put back on-line. Attendant skills, tooling,
and gas management capacity are not available in the baseline system to allow
replacement at this level.
Unitized construction of the cooling tubes, meteoroid bumpers, and space-
craft structure as well as the length of radiator cooling tubes preclude classifying
the Heat Rejection System as a line replaceable unit. In view of this, all com-
ponents of the Heat Rejection System (e.g., sensors, pumps), with the exception
of the radiator tubes, are made line replaceable. In addition, extensive redundancy
is employed in the baseline system because of the complexity of removal and re-
placement of heat rejection components.
Gas Management System components are replaceable if they are upstream
of the solenoid valves that isolate this system from the PCS. The jacking gas
supply is paralleled with the second onboard Gas Management System during re-
placement to provide a continuous source of jacking gas to protect the journal and
thrust bearing.
The electronic monitoring and control assembly is divided into three separate
modules (Voltage Regulator/Exciter, Speed Control, and Signal Conditioning) which
are independently packaged. The speed control portion is further divided into three
LRUs, one to sense each phase of the 1200 Hz, 120 V, 12. 5 kWe alternator output
and apply or remove parasitic loading to maintain constant frequency under varying
load and alternator output conditions. Each control circuit loads all three phases
simultaneously. Each replaceable unit provides a total of six kilowatts of para-
sitic load so any one control circuit can be in the OFF position without affecting
overall system performance.
The retractable shield is used for nuclear radiation reduction and is capable
of being retracted to allow a thermal radiation path from the heat source to the
inside of the spacecraft for emergency cooling. At launch, the heat shield contains
5 inches of LiH to meet the dose criteria for the first 2 1/2 years. Additional
shielding of 3 inches of LiH and 0.2 inch of depleted U238 is required to meet the
dose criteria for the period from 2 1/2 to 10 years.
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Section 4
OCS CHECKOUT STRATEGIES
4.1 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY
Before further requirements analysis, it is necessary to develop a checkout
strategy for all Space Station subsystems to meet checkout objectives, which can
be summarized as follows:
* To increase crew and equipment safety by providing an immediate
indication of out-of-tolerance conditions
* To improve system availability and long-life subsystems assurancy
by expediting maintenance tasks and increasing the probability
that systems will function when needed
* To provide flexibility to accommodate changes and growth in both
hardware and software
* To minimize development and operational risks
Specific mission or vehicle-related objectives which can be imposed upon
subsystem level equipment and subsystem responsibilities include the following:
* OCS should be largely autonomous of ground control.
* Crew participation in routine checkout functions should be minimized.
* The design should be modular in both hardware and software to
accommodate growth and changes.
* OCS should be integrated with, or have design commonality with,
other onboard hardware or software.
* The OCS should use a standard hardware interface with equipment
under test to facilitate the transfer of data and to make the system
responsi-v-e-to changes.
* Failures should be isolated to an LRU such that the faulty unit can be
quickly removed and replaced with an operational unit.
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* A Caution and Warning System should be provided to facilitate crew
warning and automatic "safing" where required.
* Provisions must be included to select and transmit any part or all of
the OCS test data points to the ground.
To attain these objectives via the use of an Onboard Checkout System which
is integrated with the Data Management System, checkout strategies have been
developed which are tailored to each Space Station subsystem.
Special emphasis has been applied to a strategy for checkout of redundant
elements peculiar to each subsystem. The degree to which each of these func-
tions is integrated into the DMS is also addressed.
4. 1. 1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
Each major Space Station subsystem was examined with respect to the re-
quired checkout functions. The checkout functions associated with each subsystem
are identified and analyzed as to their impact on the onboard checkout task. The
functions considered are those necessary to verify operational status, detect and
isolate faults, and to verify proper operation following fault correction. Specific
functional requirements considered include stimulus generation, sensing, signal
conditioning, limit checking, trend analysis, and fault isolation.
The Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) consists of dual Isotope/Brayton
power conversion elements and a power control and distribution network. The
power conversion elements include the isotope heat sources and aeroshells, heat
exchangers, turbines, compressors, alternators, and Gas Management Systems.
The control and distribution network consists of transformer/rectifier assem-
blies, voltage regulators, static sine wave and square wave inverters, batteries,
battery chargers, and circuit protection and switching devices.
4.1.1.1 Checkout Functions
The EPS encompasses a wide variety of equipment including electrical,
electronic, mechanical, and fluid systems. This results in a diversity of check-
out requirements as identified in the following sections.
* Stimulus Generation - Stimulus generation requirements imposed by the
EPS, except for control and switching purposes, are relatively few and
simple. These consist of simulated current unbalance inputs required
to periodically test the operation of differential protection relays, simu-
lated reverse current inputs to periodically test reverse current
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sensors, and simulated phase unbalance (open phase) signals to test
phase balance protection circuits. These stimuli may take the form of
fixed value currents or voltages, depending upon the final design of the
protection circuitry.
· Sensing - Sensing requirements imposed by the EPS are listed in
Appendix I of the Task 1 Final Report. Measurement sensor and
transducer requirements are generally well within current instru-
mentation capabilities. Sensor outputs are directly measurable as a
dc voltage within specified ranges, or are converted to standard mea-
surement voltages by appropriate signal conditioning circuitry.
Selected sensors are implemented redundantly due to the criticality of
the measurement or to the difficulty of replacing a failed unit. Critical
parameters with redundant instrumentation include heat source temper-
ature, compressor inlet temperature, compressor discharge pressure,
turbine inlet temperature, bearing cavity pressures, and turbine speed.
These redundant sensors provide the opportunity to perform cross cor-
relation and calibration of measurements.
* Signal Conditioning - Signal conditioning is required for all sensor
outputs which do not fall within the standard measurement capability
of the Remote Data Acquisition Units. The requirements include strain
gauge temperature probe conditioning networks, ac-to-dc converters,
and frequency-to-dc converters. These devices perform signal con-
version and scaling as necessary to provide a standard output to the
Data Acquisition System.
* Limit Checking - Limit checking routines are used to verify that critical
parameters such as the isotope heat source temperatures, compressor
temperature and pressures, turbine temperatures and speeds, and
bearing cavity pressure remain within tolerance. Limit tests are utilized
within the Power Distribution System to monitor bus currents and vol-
tages and to monitor the states of automatic circuit protection devices
such as circuit breakers and phase balance protection relays.
* Trend Analysis - Opportunities to apply trend analysis techniques to the
EPS are limited. Meaningful trend data may be obtained from selected
temperature measurements in the isotope heat source and in certain
equipment items. The latter include bearing temperatures in the rota-
t-ing-ma-chiner-y, and-heat-si-nk--temperatur-es--in--equi-pment--such-as--voltage
regulators and inverters. These are relatively short-term trend param-
eters and may provide indications of degradation or incipient failure.
Longer term trend parameters include heat exchanger and radiator
inlet/outlet temperatures and flow rates which may be used to identify
and project efficiency degradation in these systems.
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* Fault Isolation - Fault isolation is accomplished through comparison
of measured operating conditions with predetermined limits and by
combinatorial analysis of input/output measurements and associated
performance parameters. Redundant element substitution is also used
where available.
4.1. 1.2 Redundant Element Checkout
Redundant elements in the EPS include critical protection and switching
devices, transformer/rectifier units, voltage regulators, 400-Hz square wave
inverter, 60-Hz and 400-Hz sine wave inverters, 600-Hz motor/generator,
batteries, and battery chargers. These are isolatible by switching. Checkout
of the redundant units is accomplished by switching them on-line periodically
and verifying proper functioning under normal operating conditions. A.special
situation exists in the case of the 600-Hz motor/generators, as both the primary
and redundant units are normally used only to provide motoring start current to
the Brayton cycle 1200 Hz alternator, a function normally performed only during
initial activation of the Space Station. Periodic checkout of these units therefore
requires a dummy load to substitute for the alternator and permit testing to be
performed without interrupting alternator operation.
The inverters also present a special case. These units are not designed for
parallel operation. A redundant off-line unit cannot be rotated on line without
first interrupting the ac loads. To avoid this, a dummy load is provided for
checkout of redundant inverters.
4. 1. 1.3 Integration with Data Management Subsystem
Stimulus requirements in the EPS involve primarily fixed value currents
or voltages associated with testing of circuit protection devices. These devices
are distributed throughout the Space Station rather than being concentrated, and
the devices themselves are generally relatively simple. This combination of con-
ditions favors external rather than built-in stimulus generation. A requirement
is therefore imposed on the DMS to generate these stimuli and to control their
application to the appropriate EPS test points.
Measurement sensors, transducers, and signal conditioning for the EPS
are provided as an integral part of that subsystem. The signal interface between
the EPS and the DMS is in the form of a DC voltage for each measurement. The
voltage levels are in the ranges of 0. 20 mV, 0-5 V, and 0-28 V.
4-4
4.2 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY
This analysis identifies the integrated checkout functions associated with
Space Station subsystems during the manned orbital phase of the mission. These
functions are depicted in Figure 4-1 and are those required to ensure overall
availability of the Space Station. Characteristic of integrated testing is the fact
that the test involves subsystem interfaces, and, therefore, test objectives are
associated with more than one subsystem.
4.2.1 INTEGRATED STRATEGY
Six checkout functions have been identified:
* Caution and warning
* Fault detection
* Trend analysis
* Operational status
* Periodic checkout
* Fault isolation
These functions represent a checkout strategy of continuous monitoring and
periodic testing with eventual fault isolation to a line replaceable unit (LRU).
Under this aspect the functions are grouped as -
CONTINUOUS MONITORING PERIODIC TESTING FAULT ISOLATION
* Caution and warning * Automatic tests · Localize to SS
· Fault detection * Operational * Isolate to RLU
* Trend analysis Verification
* Operational status
General characteristics of these groups are defined below:
4.2.1. 1 Continuous Monitoring
Continuous monitoring is not a test per se. It is a concept of continuously
sampling and evaluating key subsystem parameters for in/out-of-tolerance con-
ditions. This evaluation does not necessarily confirm that the subsystems have
failed or are operating properly. The evaluation is only indicative of the general
status of the subsystems. For example, a condition exists where the integrated sub-
systems are indicating in-limit conditions, but during the next series of attitude con-
trol commands, an error in Space Station position is sensed and displayed. Since
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three subsystems, DMS, GN&C, and P/RCS, are involved in generating and
controlling the Space Station attitude, a "positional error" malfunction is not
directly related to a subsystem malfunction. The malfunction indication is only
indicative of an out-of-tolerance condition of an integrated function. Final resolu-
tion of the problem to a subsystem and eventually to LRU will require diagnostic
test-procedures that are separate from the continuous monitoring function.
There are situations in which the parameters being monitored are intended
to be directly indicative of the condition of a subsystem or an LRU. Examples of
these include tank pressures, bearing temperatures, and power source voltages.
However, even in these simpler cases when a malfunction is detected, an integrated
evaluation will be performed to ascertain that external control functions, transducers,
signal conditioning, and the DMS functions of data acquisition, transmission, and
computation are performing properly. This evaluation will result in either a sub-
stantiation of the malfunction or identification of a problem external to the param-
eter being monitored.
Figure 4-1 shows the logic associated with each function in the continuous
monitoring group, as well as the integrated relationships between these and the
total checkout functions. The caution/warning and fault detection functions are
alike in their automatic test and malfunction detection approaches, but are differ-
ent in terms of parameter criticality and malfunction reaction. The caution/warn-
ing function monitors parameters that are indicative of conditions critical to crew
or equipment safety. Parameters not meeting this criticality criteria are handled
as fault detection functions. Figure 4-1 shows that in the event of a critical mal-
function, automatic action is initiated to warn the crew and sequence the sub-
systems to a safe condition. Before this automatic action is taken, the subsystems
must be evaluated to ascertain that the failure indication is not a false alarm and
that the corrective action can be implemented. After the action is taken, the sub-
systems must be evaluated to determine that proper crew safety conditions exist.
Since automatic failure detection and switching can be integral to subsystem de-
sign (self-contained correction) and subsystems can be controlled by the operation-
al software or manual controls, it is imperative that the status of these events be
maintained and that the fault detection and correction software be interfaced with
the prime controlling software. For malfunctions that are not critical, the crew
is notified of their occurrence, but any subsequent action is initiated manually.
The next continuous monitoring function, trend analysis, automatically ac-
quires data and analyzes the historical pattern to determine signal drift and the
need for unscheduled calibration. It also predicts faults and indicates the need
-for diagnost-i-c--a-nd--fa-u-lt -iso-la-t-ion--a-ct-i-v-i-t-ies-. A-n--e-xa-rmple--of-a--pa-r-a-meter- -i-n- -t-hi-s
category is the partial pressure of nitrogen. Nitrogen is used to establish the
proper total pressure of the Space Station. Since it is an inert gas, the only make-
up requirements are those demanded by leakage or airlock operation. The actual
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nitrogen flow rate is measured, and calculations are performed which make
allowances for normal leakage and operational use. When these calculations
indicate a trend toward more than anticipated use, the crew is automatically
notified and testing is initiated to isolate the problem to the gas storage and
control equipment or to an excessive leak path. The historical data is not only
useful in predicting conditions but is also useful in providing trouble-shooting clues.
The data might reveal, for example, that the makeup rate increased significantly
after the use of an airlock. This could lead directly to verifying excessive seal
leakage.
The final continuous monitor function is in operational status. This function
is performed by the crew and is nonautomatic with the exception of the DMS com-
puter programs associated with normal Space Station operational control and
display functions. The concept of continuous monitoring recognized and takes
advantage of the crew's presence and judgment in evaluating Space Station per-
formance. In many instances the crew can discern between acceptable and un-
acceptable performance, and they can clearly recognize physically-damaged
equipment or abnormal conditions.
4. 2.1. 2 Periodic Testing
As opposed to continuous monitoring, periodic testing is a detailed evalua-
tion of how well the Space Station subsystems are performing. Figure 4-1 shows
that periodic testing is not accomplished by any one technique. Rather, a com-
bination of operational and automatic test approaches is employed. The actual
operational use of equipment is often the best check of the performance of that
equipment. Operation of Space Station equipment and use of the normal operating
controls and displays will be used in detecting faults and degradation in the sub-
systems. This mode of testing is primarily limited to that equipment whose
performance characteristics are easily discernible, such as for motors, lighting
circuits, and alarm functions.
Automatic testing is performed in two basic modes:
* With the subsystems in an operating mode, the DMS executes a diagnos-
tic test procedure which verifies that integrated Space Station functions
are being properly performed under normal interface conditions in
response to natural or designed stimulation. This mode of testing
allows the evaluation of Space Station performance without interrupting
mission operations.
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* For those situations where the integrated performance or interface
compatibility between subsystems cannot be determined without known
references or control conditions, the DMS will execute a diagnostic
procedure in a test mode. In this. mode, control, reference, 'or bias
signals will be switched in or superimposed on the subsystems to allow
an exact determination of their performance or localization of problem
between the interfaces. Since the test mode may temporarily inhibit
normal operations, the DMS must interleave the test and operational
software to maintain the Space Station in a known and safe configuration.
The scheduled automatic tests are performed to verify availability or proper
configuration of "on-line" subsystems, redundant equipment, and alternate modes.
* Periodic Verification of "On-Line" Subsystems - The first checkout
requirement is a periodic verification that on-line subsystems are
operating within acceptable performance margins. The acceptable
criteria for this evaluation is based on subsystem parameter limits and
characteristics exhibited during Space Station factory acceptance or
pre-flight testing. The rejection criteria and subsequent decision to
repair or reconfigure subsystems is based on the criticality of the
failure mode. If the subsystems appear to be operating properly, but
the test clearly indicates an out-of-tolerance condition, then one of the
following alternatives must be implemented:
- If the failure mode is critical, the crew normally takes immediate
action to isolate and clear the problem.
- If the failure mode is not critical, the crew can take immediate
action, schedule the work at a later time, or wait until the condi-
tion degrades to an unacceptable level.
* Redundant Equipment Verification - A second checkout requirement is
verifying that standby, off-line, or redundant equipment and associated
control and switching mechanisms are operable. The acceptable/re-
jection criteria for these evaluations is identical to those for normally
operating equipment. A primary distinction of this function is that
equipment may have known failures from previous usage or tests. This
situation occurs when the crew has knowledge of a failure but has not
elected to perform the necessary corrective action; The checkout
function then becomes one of equipment status accounting and main-
tenance/repair scheduling. The status information is interlocked with
mission procedures and software to preclude activation of failed units
while they are being repaired or until proper operation following repair
is verified.
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e Alternate Mode Verification - The third checkout function is verifying the
availability of alternate modes of operation. This function is essentially
a confidence check of the compatibility of subsystems'interaction and
performance during and after a change in the operating mode. To some
extent this function overlaps with redundant equipment verification, but
is broader in scope in that it verifies other system-operating character-
istics. For example, some modes will involve manual override or
control of automatic functions or automatic power-down sequences.
4.2. 1. 3 Fault Isolation
Fault isolation to an LRU is a Space Station goal. As shown in Figure 4-1,
fault isolation testing is initiated when malfunction indications cannot be directly
related to a failed LRU. The integrated test functions associated with fault isola-
tion are localizing a malfunction to a subsystem or to an explicit interface between
two subsystems and identifying the subroutine test necessary for LRU isolation.
In structuring this relationship between integrated subsystem tests for fault local-
ization and subroutine tests for fault isolation, the DMS, in conjunction with the
test procedure documentation, must establish an effective man-machine interface
so that in the event of an unsolved malfunction the crew will be able to help evalu-
ate the condition and determine other test sequences necessary to isolate the
problem. To accomplish this requirement, the DMS must be capable of displaying
test parameters and instructions in engineering units and language and be capable
of referencing these outputs to applicable documentation or programs that correl-
ate test results to corrective action required by the crew.
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Section 5
ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST DEFINITIONS
5.1 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS
The on-orbit tests required to insure the availability of the Space Station
subsystems are defined herein. Also delineated are the measurement and
stimulus parameters required to perform these tests. Two discrete levels of
testing are defined, i. e., continuous status monitoring tests for fault detection of
critical and noncritical parameters, and subsystem fault isolation tests for
localization of faults to a specific Line Replaceable Unit. In addition to these two
levels, tests are defined for periodic checkout and calibration of certain units,
and parameters requiring analysis of trends are defined.
Due to the software module approach to DMS checkout, it was deemed
necessary to estimate the CPU time and memory required to implement these
modules along with an assessment of the services required from an Executive
Software System to control the checkout.
These test descriptions, measurement, and stimulus information provided
for each subsystem, and the software sizing information provided for the Data
Management System provide the data required to estimate the checkout impact
on the DMS software and hardware. Table 5-1 is a summary of the measurement
and stimulus requirements for the Space Station.
The baseline Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) consists of dual Isotope/
Brayton power conversion systems and a transmission, conditioning, and distri-
bution system.
5. 1. 1 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM
The Isotope/Brayton System (IBS) produces the electrical power for the
Space Station by converting thermal energy from plutonium isotope heat sources
to electrical energy through Brayton cycle turbine-driven alternators.
The IBS consists of the heat source assemblies, heat exchangers, rotating
power conversion units, Gas Management System, and voltage-regulator/speed
cont-r-ol--assemblies. The system -also-inc-ludes an atmosphe-re--reentr-y and recovery
system (IRV) for emergency jettison and return of the heat sources.
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Appendix I-7 of the Task 1 Final Report contains a listing of the measure-
ments and stimuli associated with the IBS.
Operation of the IBS is in a closed-loop automatic mode and is controlled
by the Data Management System (DMS).
To provide heat source control, the compressor inlet temperature, turbine
inlet temperature, heat source capsule hot spot temperature, and BeO hot spot
temperature are processed by the heat source control logic. Position indicators
tell when the heat source is in the "operating" mode and when it is extended and
radiating into space in the "emergency cooling" mode.
The power conversion Brayton gas loop is controlled by the turbine inlet tem-
perature, the compressor inlet temperature, the bearing cavity pressure, and the
compressor outlet pressure.
In addition to the gas loop instrumentation, there are several electrical
parameters included with the Power Conversion System to provide fault detection
and control for the alternator. These are alternator output, load bus, series and
shunt field currents, alternator output voltage, and frequencies. The voltages,
currents, and frequencies together with voltage regulators/exciter and speed con-
trol circuitry provide the signals necessary to maintain specified speed and voltage
regulation. They also provide the signals vital to normal startup and shutdown as
well as emergency control in case of critical level out-of-tolerance voltages,
currents, and speeds.
The Gas Management System contains pressure and temperature transducers
for monitoring the status of the reserve supply of the Xe-He gas for the power
conversion loop. It also includes several valves to provide a controlled gas supply
to the thrust bearings, journal bearings, and for maintenance of the loop gas
inventory. Auxiliary contacts on each valve act as positive position indicators to
show the status of the valves.
The IRV is utilized only for emergency disposal of the heat source. It con-
sists of an ejection mechanism, passive stabilization and control system, ballute
type descent system, and recovery aids such as radio beacon and flashing light.
5. 1. 1. 1 Status Monitoring
Status monitoring is utilized on selected performance parameters to detect
system faults. Acceptance or rejection of status measurements is based upon
comparison of the measured values against predetermined limits and/or against
parallel redundant parameters.
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The majority of the status monitoring parameters are safety critical and are
treated as caution and/or warning parameters. Detection of an out-of-limit condi-
tion in one of these measurements results in activation of the crew alarm and also
in the initiation of automatic fault isolation and safing procedures. Certain param-
eters are identified in both the caution and the warning category. These involve
two-level limit checking.
5. 1. 1. 2 Trend Analysis
Trend analyses are applicable to several of the IBS functions. In particular,
analysis of temperatures and pressures in the Brayton loop and heat rejection loops
is useful in ascertaining the efficiency of the system and spotting degradation in
performance. The trends of critical heat source temperatures are of interest
from a safety standpoint.
5. 1. 1.3 Periodic Checkout
Periodic tests are required to supplement the continuous status monitoring
in order to make a quantitative evaluation of system operating characteristics and
to verify the operation of standby or inactive systems. Items in the latter category
include the drive mechanisms for extending the heat sources to their emergency
cooling positions and the IRV Systems. The test sequence is not critical but
normally begins with verification of the DMS control interfaces, followed by check-
ing of the IRV Systems and heat source extension mechanisms. It should be noted
that functional testing of the extension systems requires short-term interruption
of power generation in the unit being tested. Power distribution and consumption
during this period must be managed accordingly, and proper operation must be
reverified upon completion of the test.
5. 1. 1. 4 Fault Isolation
The IRV heat source and Brayton power conversion loop are major subsys-
tems that are line replaceable units. The Gas Management and Heat Rejection
Systems are line replaceable at the component level. Electrical control components
such as the voltage regulator exciter and speed control are line replaceable as
individual units. Integration of the radiator cooling flow tubes into the vehicle
structure precludes inclusion of the Heat Rejection System as a line replaceable
unit. Instead, the components are either line replaceable or have built-in redun-
dancy. The Heat Rejection System itself is a redundant element of the Power
System so that the Power System electrical production does not have to be disturbed
during the replacement of components. The pump motor has instrumentation to
isolate pump failures (pump pressure out and flow rates) from power failure (pump
current and voltage). Deterioration of the pump motor can be detected from trend
analysis of the power drawn by the unit and the deterioration can be segregated
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from deterioration of the fluid cooling loop or coolant by comparing the change in
power drawn (motor current) with the pump head (pump outlet pressure). Changes
in individual flow rates, temperature rise across cold plates, and hot spot tem-
peratures can be used to isolate cooling (cold plate) failures from failures in the
components they are designed to cool. Radiator outlet temperature is an important
parameter for judging the condition of the fin surface coating of the radiator. At
any instance, only one heat rejection loop for each Power Conversion System is
operating and only one of the two pumps is in operation so that only one set of
transducer signals are needed to provide data. The hot spot temperatures are
critical parameters, however, and the triple redundancy is required to isolate
instrumentation faults from operating system faults to prevent false caution signals.
A typical fault isolation flow is illustrated in Figure 5-1. Here a fault in the
heat rejection pump gives the first indication of a fault by setting off the caution
alarm for the isotope heat source capsule temperature. The chart demonstrates
that even though the fault occurred in a component far removed from the parameter
that gave the indication, adequate instrumentation is available to isolate the fault
at the faulted component. In actual practice, more than one fault alarm may occur
(such as capsule temperature and pump hot spot temperature, or capsule tempera-
ture and compressor outlet temperature) which would lead directly to isolating the
fault.
5.1.2 TRANSMISSION, CONDITIONING, AND DISTRIBUTION
This section discusses the monitoring and control requirements for the
Transmission, Conditioning and Distribution (TCD) portion of the EPS. Appendix
I-8 provides a TCD measurement/stimulus list which identifies the specific
parameters, stimuli, and response functions required to check the system and to
determine its operational status.
The TCS System requires a minimum of crew supervision. Operational
parameters consist of alternator feeder current readouts, battery status, and
principal primary and secondary bus voltages. The feeder current readouts,
together with alternator output power displays establish the degree of load balance
between the two Brayton PCS units. A small amount of unbalance is inherent in
the system. Crew action is required only if the normal range is exceeded (as
detected by the Power Management Assembly), or if high experiment activity re-
quiring maximum possible power from the Brayton machines is imminent. Crew
response under these conditions is to shift load from one machine to the other by
selective switching of loads.
Battery status displays and readouts of selected bus voltages provide addi-
tional information for evaluating system performance and capability for accepting
additional load. The ability to call up the status of any other system element, as
may be deemed necessary for evaluation of a particular operational condition,
provides the flexibility required to ensure adequate status assessments at any
given time.
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All circuit breakers and contactors for power transmission lines, source
and distributor buses, and power conditioning equipment can be remotely con-
trolled. Many are controlled by signals from automatic protection equipment such
as differential or reverse current relays. Remote control is also required to
provide for either manual or programmed reconfiguration of the TCD System
following automatic fault-clearing operations, as well as for facilitating recon-
figuration to match changing load or other operational conditions. Additional con-
trols are provided to support checkout functions.
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Figure 5-1. Typical LRU Malfunction Isolation Flow Chart
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It is important to note at this point that no capability is shown for remote
control of individual circuit breakers in the distribution circuits to the loads. It
is assumed for the purpose of this study that all switching of loads is accomplished
in the load systems themselves rather than by opening and closing circuit breakers
in the power lines to individual loads. Final definition of load switching control
design is yet to be developed.
5. 1. 2. 1 Status Monitoring
Continuous monitoring is required to detect out-of-tolerance conditions for
parameters such as alternator load-sharing, principal bus voltages, and equipment
temperatures. Continuous monitoring is also required to detect abnormal events.
These include relay trips, circuit breaker and contactor trips, and power condi-
tioner overload (current limiting signal).
Alternator feeder currents and most bus voltages are sampled at the rate of
six per minute. Feeder current values should stay fairly constant during normal
operation, but as previously mentioned, some unbalance is inherent. A sampling
rate of six per minute for bus voltages should eliminate the effects of voltage
transients (assuming a fault signal is generated only if an out-of-tolerance condi-
tion is sensed in two consecutive samples), while still providing a reasonable
response time for follow-on corrective action. The higher sampling rate of once
per second for 28 Vdc and 400 Hz load bus voltages assures minimum delay in
detecting out-of-tolerance voltages at the principal load interfaces. For this
higher rate, abnormal voltage should be sensed in a minimum of five consecutive
samples before a fault signal is generated.
Equipment temperatures are sampled at a rate of four per hour. Considering
thermal lags inherent in the equipment being monitored, this rate should be ade-
quate for all but catastrophic failures.
Relay trips are nominally monitored at a one-sample-per-minute rate. Cir-
cuit breaker and contactor trips are sampled at a rate of two per minute. This
allows a margin for contact opening time before the next sample is taken. If the
next sample does not show a contactor trip, it is presumed the contactor will not
operate to clear the fault and alternate corrective action is immediately taken.
An exception to the nominal sampling rates is shown for the alternator feeder/source
bus differential relays. The rate here is one sample per second. This is because
operation of these relays results in tripping the associated alternator circuit breaker,
with a consequent loss of one-half the station primary power. The sampling rate for
the alternator circuit breaker is five per second, also much higher than nominal.
These relatively high rates are required to minimize system and load disturbances
in switching to a backup mode of operation.
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A sampling rate of two per minute is chosen for detection of power condi-
tioning equipment operating in a current-limited overload mode. Again, this allows
a margin'for transient overloads.
No life-critical functions have been identified for the TCD System. An
unscheduled opening of the alternator feeder circuit breaker, however, results in
loss of one-half of the primary power source and is therefore listed as a caution
function. Loss of 260 Vdc bus voltage is also listed since this results in interrup-
tion of all 400 Hz power. Loss of 400 Hz square wave bus voltage and loss of 400
Hz sine wave bus voltage are included since they result in interruption of all 400
Hz square wave and sine wave power, respectively.
5. 1. 2. 2 Periodic Checkout
Periodic checkouts will be performed at intervals ranging from once per
week to once each six months depending on equipment or parameters to be checked.
The principal tests required to ensure TCD System performance, integrity,
and availability are listed in Table 5-2. In addition to these tests, checks of
selective switch positions, interlocks, system load distribution, and availability
of load bank equipment are required. Tests for relay, circuit breaker, and con-
tactor operations can generally be accomplished on line during periods of relatively
low-scheduled experiment activity; system switching effects will be minimal. No
major shock producing tests, such as power line faults or fault clearing, are
planned.
Complexity of checkout varies from simple readouts of parameters, such as
voltage or temperature, to injection of test currents into current transformer
loop circuits to simulate fault conditions seen by protection relays. An example
of a procedure which typifies the range of parameter testing and also illustrates
the handling of redundant units is given in Table 5-3 for the high voltage rectifier-
regulators.
5.1.2.3 Calibration
No requirements for calibration are listed. A limited amount of calibration
may be required for certain relay installations. This has not been analyzed at
this time.
5. 1.2.4 Trend Analysis
A limited amount of trend analysis is necessary for TCD parameters. These
are identified in Appendix I-7 of the Task 1 Final Report.
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Table 5-2. Transmission Conditioning and Distribution System Periodic Tests
(Isotope/Brayton)
Test Rationale
Protective Relay Operation
Circuit Breaker and
Contactor Operation
Standby Redundant Equip-
ment Operation
Battery Charger Mode
Switching
Alternator Load Sharing
Regulated Transformer-
Rectifier Load Sharing
Power Conditioning Equip-
ment Parameters
Bus Voltages
Battery Monitor Voltage
and Temperature
To verify proper operation of pro-
tective devices
To determine remote operability of
breakers and contactors
To verify operational capability of
standby units
To determine charger response to
control inputs
To determine whether load balance
is within allowable tolerances
To determine whether load balance
is within allowable tolerances
To determine nominal performance
capability and degradation, if any,
with respect to like units
To assess general health of TCD
system
To determine battery status
5. 1. 2. 5 Fault Isolation
Control signals for opening and closing remotely operable circuit breakers,
contactors, and switches are required for fault isolation. These signals are
operated internal to the TCD System (e. g., differential protection sensing and
relay output) to provide coordinated automatic fault clearing, and external to the
system for checkout purposes. A typical fault isolation flow diagram is given in
Figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-2. 
Typical Fault Isolation Flow
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Table 5-3. Periodic Checkout High Voltage Rectifier-Regulators
1. Apply primary power to one off-line redundant unit.
2. Monitor open-circuit output voltage level.
3. Apply overload test current to secondary of current limiting sensing
circuit and monitor for current limiting mode alarm.
4. Remove test current and reset current limiting mode alarm circuit.
5. Repeat steps 1 - 4 with second off-line redundant unit.
6. Connect first off-line unit to 260 Vdc bus and verify that input
current, output current, and output voltage are within specified
limits.
7. Repeat step 6 with second off-line unit.
8. Verify that the two units share load within specified limits.
9. Disconnect the two previously on-line units and assign them to the
standby redundant mode.
10. Reverify load sharing between the two on-line units.
11. Continue operation with the new unit assignments until the next
checkout period or until reconfiguration is required for other
operational reasons.
5.2 INTEGRATED TEST DEFINITION
The task of ensuring overall Space Station availability is primarily dependent
upon the proper structuring of individual subsystem tests. The ability to test the
subsystems independent of other subsystems is directly related to the number and
types of interfaces. As shown in Figure 5-3, the DMS and Electrical Power Sub-
systems (EPS) interface with every other Space Station subsystem. In addition,
the EC/LS Subsystem provides cooling to most of the electronic packages.
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This situation demands that in constructing the test for a subsystem these inter-
faces be taken into account so that erroneous or ambiguous test results will not
be obtained. In other words, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tests are
initiated, a higher level of testing should be performed to verify that all interfaces
and Space Station conditions that influence the subsystem are proper. Properly
designed, these higher-level tests will (1) indicate what Space Station conditions
must be verified, maintained, or changed; (2) localize the malfunction to a single
subsystem; and (3) identify the subroutine test necessary for fault isolation.
Since the DMS interfaces with all of the Space Station subsystems and is
used as the OCS, it would appear that all of the tests would be integrated. How-
ever, this is not a proper interpretation. When the DMS is used to verify the
performance of another subsystem, it must first establish itself as a test standard
against which the subsystem parameters are compared. Subsequent to this veri-
fication, the test is dedicated to the evaluation of the subsystem. This test would
be considered as an independent test since the objective of the test was to Verify
the subsystem and not the DMS. For a test to be considered as an integrated test
it must meet one or more of the following conditions:
* Test objectives associated with more than one subsystem
· Test involves subsystem interfaces
* Test requires proper operation of other subsystems
In several cases, the DMS must simultaneously perform the dual role of
OCS and functional elements. As an example, the DMS has a functional interface
with the GN&C and Prop Subsystems for the computation of guidance equations and
the execution of commands to the control actuators. When this functional closed
loop is being tested, the DMS must, in addition to performing its normal functions,
execute the test routine. For this type of integrated test there must be an intrinsic
relationship between the operational and test software. This relationship must be
carefully considered in structuring the integrated tests since unstable or inter-
mittent performance may be detected only in the exact operating mode under
closed-loop conditions. The number of integrated tests is not extensive due to the
approach of minimizing the different types of interfaces between Space Station sub-
systems. For example, interfaces between the DMS and other subsystems are
largely standardized. As a result, relatively common tests can be designed for
verification of the multitude of DMS subsystem interfaces or for localization of a
fault to one side of a DMS subsystem interface. All special integrated tests that
have been identified are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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5.2.1 DMS/EPS
The DMS has a power management interface with the Electrical Power Sub-
system. This function primarily includes start-up, control and shutdown of the
power conversion equipment, and the control and reconfiguring of the power pro-
file through the distribution buses. Fault isolation is performed by a DMS self-
check that verifies proper generation and transmission of control functions to the
interface.
The startup, control, and shutdown of the power conversion equipment by
the DMS is another example of the integral relationship that must exist between
the operational and test software. For example, in starting the Isotope/Brayton
System the automatic operational procedure must contain exact instructions for a
normal start and an additional set of instructions for aborting or safing an abnormal
start. To know the starting sequence (operational software) is not proceeding as
planned implies a knowledge of what is wrong (test software). Based upon this
knowledge the DMS can execute the appropriate operational controls and identify
the malfunctioning element.
5. 2.2 EC/LS - EPS ISOTOPE/BRAYTON INTERFACE
The Environmental Control/Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem interfaces with
the EPS Isotope/Brayton System for removal of waste heat via a fluid heat ex-
changer installed in the Brayton Power Conversion System. It is planned that
flow rate, temperature, and pressure parameters be continuously monitored on
both sides of the interface as part of normal EPS and EC/LS Subsystem checks.
5.2.3 EPS - SUBSYSTEM INTERFACE
The Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) supplies power to all assemblies of
other subsystems requiring electrical power. Interfaces between the EPS Trans-
mission, Conditioning, and Distribution (TCD) System and other subsystem assem-
blies are standardized throughout the Space Station. In addition, the tests and
associated measurement/stimulus requirements defined for the EPS have indicated
that a comprehensive capability exists for checking TCD outputs. Fault localiza-
tion between TCD assemblies and elements of other subsystems can therefore be
accomplished by'EPS Subsystem-oriented tests.
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Section 6
SOFTWARE
6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The recommended software checkout startegy involves a sequence of
detecting faults, isolating faults to a failing LRU or LRUs, and reconfiguring the
system to continue operation while the failures are being repaired.
This recommendation was developed by evaluating each subsystem with
respect to the three general requirements of fault detection, fault isolation, and
reconfiguration.
Fault detection incorporates both the recognition of failure occurrence, and
the prediction of when a failure can be expected to occur. The Remote Data
Acquisition Units (RDAUs) continually check selected test point measurements
against upper and lower limits, and notify the executive on an exception basis when
a limit is exceeded. This approach avoids occupying the central multi-processor
with the low-information task of verifying that measurements are within limits.
Trend analysis is a fault detection technique recommended for predicting the
time frame during which a failure can be anticipated. Data is acquired on a basis
of time or utilization, and compared with previous history to determine if a "trend"
toward degraded performance or impending failure can be detected.
Another checkout requirement evaluated for each subsystem is periodic
testing. This type of test is provided to exercise specific components at extended
time intervals or prior to specific events, to assure operational integrity. In the
event that a failure is detected, the periodic test will isolate to the failing Line
Replaceable Unit (LRU) and accomplish recertification after a repair operation.
Calibration of specific subsystem components will be required periodically,
or subsequent to a repair and/or replace operation. The techniques involved are
unique to the individual component; and, in some cases, require the acquisition of
operational data.
Fault isolation is required when a fault is detected. When a particular fault
provides an indication that a life critical failure has occurred, the fault isolation
routines are automatically initiated. If the failure does not represent an immediate
danger to the vehicle occupants, the crew is notified and they will initiate the fault
isolation modules at their convenience.
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The basic requirements of the fault isolation function is to analyze the avail-
able information relevant to a problem, and identify the LRU which is responsible
for the anomaly.
Three basic approaches to meeting this requirement were considered. These
are:
· Analyze each fault as an independent problem
* Analyze each fault with a state matrix which defines the possible error
states of the subsystem
* Associate each fault with a specific subsystem, and evaluate that
subsystem in detail
The third approach was selected on a basis of software commonality and cost
effectiveness. The complexity associated with the testing can be reduced by locali-
zation of the logic associated with the analysis of the subsystem in a unique package.
The software commonality will result in reduced software development and main-
tenance costs, while increasing the reliability of the software.
The fault isolation software is structured modularly for compatibility with
the hardware structure of the subsystem. Checkout modules evaluate the per-
formance of a specific portion of the subsystem. A convenient division for this
modular structure is at the assembly level or functional area. A program module
which can determine and control the sequence in which these checkout modules are
executed is also required for each subsystem.
Subsequent to fault detection, the software associated with the subsystem
which is most likely to contain the error will be activated.
The subsystem software will analyze the error indication, and initiate a
sequence of checkout modules to isolate the problem. If successful, the crew is
notified regarding the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) to be replaced. If an error
cannot be identified, the crew is informed of the situation and has an option to
execute the periodic test of the subsystem.
After a fault has been isolated, reconfiguration software restores the
functional capability of the subsystem. This is most commonly accomplished by
exchanging a redundant element for the failing unit, or by defining an alternate
path to accomplish the required function.
The Task 2 Final Report of the basic onboard checkout techniques study
provides descriptions of the software requirements, definitions and design in
addition to detailed flow charts of specific checkout routines.
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6.2 SPACE STATION ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM
In this section, the technical aspects of the Isotope/Brayton (I/Br) and the
Solar Array (SA) checkout programs are described. The computer program com-
ponents are identified, and their functions, structure, processing, input, output,
and data base requirements are discussed.
Both the Isotope/Brayton and the Solar Array configurations of the Space
Station Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) require the same general checkout
program functions. Trend analysis is required for assessment of a series of
measurements. Status monitoring is required to smooth the effects of transients.
Fault isolation is required to locate the failed assembly and identify the LRU.
Reconfiguration involves the recovery from failure. Periodic checkout exercises
all modes of certain assemblies to verify proper operation. As discussed below,
individual functions differ in their details depending on whether the I/Br or SA
design is used.
Block diagrams of EPS in the Isotope/Brayton and Solar Array configurations
are shown in Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2, respectively.
6.2.1 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Both EPS designs require that the physical laws concerning the power sources
be employed in checkout. This reduces the number of test points while increasing
the checkout program complexity.
Because the power supplied to other subsystems is vital to their perfor-
mance, certain measurements must be made at periods of less than one seconds,
which may provide the upper bound for DMS response, both from the software and
the hardware standpoint.
The Electrical Power Subsystem is an essentially serial hierarchy of assem-
blies, compared with other subsystems of the Space Station; consequently, the
modularity of EPS checkout programs is influenced by extensive interface between
modules.
Transients can momentarily cause test points to exceed their limits and then
return to within limits without adversely affecting the load. Therefore, the RDAU
limit checking capability must be augmented by successive test point sampling at
specified intervals in order to distinguish between real out-of-tolerance conditions
and temporary ones.
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Figure 6-1. Electrical Power Subsystem Diagram, Isotope/Brayton Configuration
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6-5
6.2.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The EPS checkout programs are required to perform trend analysis, status
monitoring, fault isolation, reconfiguration and periodic checkout.
6. 2. 2. 1 Trend Analysis
Trend analysis is performed on selected parameters of the EPS for per-
formance evaluation and the detection of an impending failure prior to the time
when an actual out-of-limit measurement is obtained.
Input to the trend analysis function consists of control from the executive
at regular intervals, status of the assembly with which the parameter is associa-
ted, and a reading of the parameter itself. The requirement to sample certain solar
array parameters at a rate of once per orbit indicates a need for specifying the time
at which sampling should begin, as well as the rate at which the executive will give
control to the trend analysis function. The measurements previously obtained
are also required as input to the trend analysis function.
Output of the trend analysis function consists of the measurement collection
for storage until the next sample, displays of exceptional conditions to the crew
and/or ground, and the initiation of other checkout functions such as caution and
warning analysis, and fault isolation.
The trend analysis functions for the Isotope/Brayton design are concerned
with maintaining a fixed history of measurements for display upon request, and
with using collections of measurements to predict an impending failure. These
two methods of trend analysis are described as follows:
* Data Collection - Gather raw data from selected test points and store
on an as-requested basis. The quantity of data retained is limited to
a pre-set value, selected for each particular test point. The oldest
measurements are dropped as new ones are obtained.
* Extrapolation - Gather data as above and perform exponential
smoothing, adjustment for trend, and extrapolation after each
measurement to determine if an impending out-of-limit condition
exists.
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In addition to the two trend analysis functions described above, the Solar
Array design requires the following:
* Telemetry - Measurements obtained by this function are telemetered
directly to the ground. Provision is made for temporary onboard
storage, in case the telemetry link is unavailable.
The on-off cycling of certain assemblies requires that a status check be
performed prior to measuring the parameter. If the assembly is inactive, the
measurement is not made.
In Table 6-1 and Table 6-2, the Isotope/Brayton and Solar Array trend
analysis requirements are summarized. An estimate of the auxiliary storage
requirements for intermediate results may be estimated from the number of test
points and the number of retained measurements. Assuming 8 bits per measure-
ment and 32 bits per word, the I/Br auxiliary storage requirement for trend
analysis is approximately 66K words compared with an SA requirement of 1476K
words. These estimates include provisions for three checkpoints in the check-
point log.
6. 2. 2. 2 Status Monitoring
The status monitoring functions augment the continuous monitoring functions
provided in hardware form by the RDAU preprocessor. Control is passed to the
status monitoring functions when an RDAU limit check occurs for selected
parameters.
Input consists of test point readings and their associated limits. Output
consists of crew displays and fault detection indications if the status monitoring
function can confirm an error detected by an RDAU. If no confirmation is ob-
tained, a crew display indicating the fact that status monitoring was involved is
provided.
Information processing for both the Isotope/Brayton and the Solar Array
transmission/conditioning/distribution assembly consists of successive measure-
ments after an out-of-limit condition has been detected by an RDAU, to determine
if the parameter will remain out of limits during a pre-set number of consecutive
readings. This technique is applied to most bus voltages. The flow chart in Figure
3-14 of the Task 2 Final Report depicts a module which can be used for any
parameter requiring this type of status monitoring. The delay between measure-
ments is adjustable to meet the successive sampling rates required by each
application.
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For selected I/Br parameters such as compressor inlet temperature and
fuel capsule temperatures, measurement of parallel redundant parameters is
required to distinguish between a defective transducer LRU and a true out-of-
limit condition.
In addition, it is required to raise the limit checking threshold prior to
passing control to the caution and warning analysis module of the checkout execu-
tive. This is done for the following in the I/Br power subsystem:
· Heat Source
- Fuel Capsule Temperature
- BeO Heat Sink Temperature
* Control and Monitoring
- Speed Control Signals
6. 2. 2. 3 Periodic Checkout
Periodic checkout functions are required to supplement the continuous
monitoring performed by the RDAU hardware in order to make a quantitative
evaluation of operating characteristics, and to verify the operation of inactive
or standby systems.
Input consists of test point measurements, mode/status indications, the
configuration table, and interactions with the crew. Output consists of stimuli,
mode/status changes, configuration changes, and crew displays.
Information processing involves a variety of techniques, ranging in com-
plexity from verifying that parameters are within limits to cycling a standby
assembly through its various modes, and using it to replace an operational
assembly of the same type. Limit check verification is performed as an execu-
tive service. Other periodic tests are indicated for the Isotope/Brayton power
subsystem in Table 6-3, and for the Solar Array power subsystem in Table 6-4.
6. 2. 2. 4 Fault Isolation
The fault isolation function locates the source of error which has been
suggested by fault detection, status monitoring, crew/ground, periodic checkout,
or trend analysis. It is a goal of this function to isolate to the failed Line Re-
placeable Unit (LRU). The modular design of this function follows the design of
the EPS itself. In Figure 6-3 through Figure 6-9, two levels of detail are pre-
sented for the Isotope/Brayton hierarchy, while the Solar Array design is shown
in Figure 6-10 through Figure 6-12.
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Table 6-3. Isotope/Brayton Periodic Tests
NO. OF TEST
TEST NAME APPLICATIONS MEASUREMENTS STIMULI FREQUENCY
Drive Mechanisms 2 2 1 4/year
IRV System 2 6 - 4/year
Inverters 1 82 30 1/week
Battery Chargers 10 9 4 1/week
Selector Switches TBD TBD TBD 1/month
Motor Generators 2 22 8 1/month
Transformer-Rectifiers 5 5 1 1/month
High-Voltage Rectifiers 4 12 2 1/month
Buck Regulators 10 6 4 1/month
Circuit Breakers 1 208 208 4/year
Contactors TBD TBD TBD 4/year
Switches 1 81 81 '4/year
Differential Relays 1 6 6 2/year
Reverse-Current Relays 1 18 18 2/year
Table 6-4. Solar Array Periodic Tests
NO. OF TEST
TEST NAME APPLICATIONS MEASUREMENTS STIMULI FREQUENCY
60 Hz Inverters 2 7 3 1/week
Battery Chargers 18 11 2 1/week
Core & Boom Inverters 1 80 36 1/month
Rectifier-Filters 4 5 3 1/month
Power Contactors 1 88 88 4/year
Differential Protection 1 52 52 2/year
Array Circuit I-V Test 1 400 - 1/day
Battery Controls & Indicators 1 12 12 1/week
Battery Cell Recondition
Signals 1 72 36 1/week
Battery Cell By-Pass 1 1800 900 1/month
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Input consists of information from configuration and mode/status tables,
measurements, and crew interaction. Output consists of stimuli, commands
through operational interfaces, and displays.
Information processing consists of determining if interfaces to the subsystem
or assembly are being properly supplied, followed by an evaluation of the output
of the assembly. If the supplied interfaces from other assemblies are within
tolerance and the output is bad, the assumption is made that the fault lies within
the assembly, and further analysis is made using the test points and operational
interfaces associated with the assembly.
Some special fault isolation considerations which arise for the Electrical
Power Subsystem are outlined as follows:
* Considered as a single assembly, the interfaces supplied to EPS are
principally structural, with comparatively minor interfaces with EC/
LS and DMS.
* Some of the EPS assemblies, such as the primary buses in the I/Br
design, are connected together at the same hierarchical level.
* Assemblies of EPS tend to be serially interrelated, rather than
parallel, as in other subsystems such as GN&C.
* In the I/Br design, transducers are specified as LRUs.
Because of the simplicity of incoming interfaces, particularly at the power
conversion system level, the Electrical Power Subsystem may be used as a
beginning point for integrated fault isolation at the subsystem level.
Fault isolation for assemblies which operate in closed loops may involve
an intermediate interface evaluation after supplied interfaces are examined, in
order to evaluate tie connections at the same assembly level. In some cases,
opening the loop may be required for additional analysis. Modular concepts are
also affected by closed loop operation, since a single fault isolation program
module which addresses all the assemblies may be required, as opposed to a
module which evaluates one assembly and is used multiple times.
The serial nature of EPS requires more extensive interface between fault
isolation modules, and a deeper module nesting than would be the case for a more
parallel assembly.
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The specification of transducers as LRUs implies the use of calculations
involving alternate measurements to ascertain whether the transducer indication
is accurate. In the I/Br design, energy balance equations are employed which
make use of temperature, pressure, and fluid flow to corroborate measurements
obtained through transducers which are themselves line replaceable units.
6. 2. 2. 5 Reconfiguration
The reconfiguration function maintains the portion of the configuration table
as it applies to EPS. This function becomes active as a result of the removal of an
assembly containing a failed LRU, or the addition of an assembly after repair.
Input consists of status and configuration data from tables and symbolic
identities of the assemblies to be reconfigured. Output consists of table updates,
stimuli, and commands necessary to connect or disconnect the assembly. Mea-
surements are made to assure that the stimuli and commands have taken place.
Information processing includes the logic necessary to effect remove/replace
activities with EPS assemblies, and to record the result in the configuration and
status tables. Interface with operational programs such as start-up and shut-down
functions are required during processing associated with the I/Br combined rota-
ting unit. In both the SA and I/Br transmission, conditioning, and distribution
modules, interface with the power management operational module is required
for load balancing.
6. 2.3 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
Although the checkout programs, language, and executive are designed to
operate in a multiprocessor, there is no restriction as to the number of processors
which must be available. In fact, a uniprocessor would be sufficient, provided
enough main storage is available to contain the executive, program text, and data.
The minimum Data Management Subsystem (DMS) configuration required for an
EPS checkout function is as follows:
1 - Auxiliary Storage LRU
1 - Processor LRU
3 - Memory LRUs
1 - Data Bus Controller LRU
TBD- Data Bus Terminal LRUs
TBD- Remote Data Acquisition Unit LRUs
TBD- Stimulus Generation LRUs
This minimum configuration does not accommodate DMS failures.
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The three memory LRUs are assumed to be utilized in the following manner:
one for executive text, one for program text, and one for executive tables and pro-
gram data. The number of RDAUs and Stimulus Generation Units (SGUs) will be
determined by the function and the design details of the EPS. The number of data
bus terminals is determined from the number of RDAUs and SGUs.
6. 2. 3. 1 Interface Diagram
The relationship among the various EPS checkout functions and their means
of initiation are shown in Figure 6-13.
6. 2. 3. 2 Detailed Interface Definition
Figures 6-14 through 6-18 indicate the interface requirements for the
individual functions.
DMS
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Figure 6-3. EPS Assembly Relationships, I/BR Configuration
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Figure 6-4. LRU Interface Diagram, Gas Management Assembly
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Figure 6-5. LRU Interface Diagram, Power Conversion Subsystem
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Figure 6-9. Power TCD (Isotope/Brayton)
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PCS (Solar Array)
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Figure 6-10. T/C/D (Solar Array Configuration)
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Figure 6-11. Power Source (Solar Array Configuration)
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Figure 6-12. Assembly Diagram, Electrical Power Subsystem (Solar Array
Configuration)
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Figure 6-13. General Function Interface
6-24
(The trend analysis function receives control from an RDAU interrupt or from
the Pacer. )
TIME
Caution
Warning
Fault
Isolation
Figure 6-14. Trend Analysis Interface
(The Status Monitoring function is normally initiated by the executive as a result
of an out-of-limit condition detected by an RDAU for certain selected test points.
The function can;also be initiated by a crew or ground).
TEST POINT
Caution, Warning Analysis;
Fault Isolation
Figure 6-15. Status Monitoring Interface
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(The periodic checkout function is normally initiated by the crew; however, it
is possible to schedule the test automatically by utilizing the pacer (an executive
service whichutilizes the interval timer and a table of events)).
, . .
Figure 6-16. Periodic Checkout Interface
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(Fault isolation modules for the EPS Subsystem receive control from the
subsystem level fault isolation program and interface with the crew via
the display units).
Figure 6-17. Fault Isolation Interface
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(The reconfiguration function receives control from a crew command, or from
the fault isolation modules).
Figure 6-18. Reconfiguration Interface
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Section 7
MAINTENANCE
There are two aspects of maintenance which entered into the basic study.
Basic maintenance concepts were provided as part of the baseline resulting from
the Phase B Space Station study; they are discussed in subsection 7. 1 below.
Additionally, one of the study tasks was aimed at implementation of an onboard
electronics maintenance capability. The results of that task are summarized
in subsection 7. 2.
7.1 BASELINE MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment.
7.1.1 GENERAL SPACE STATION MAINTENANCE POLICY
It is a Space Station objective that all elements be designed for a complete
replacement maintenance capability unless maintainability design significantly
decreases program or system reliability. This objective applies to all sub-
systems wherever it is reasonable to anticipate that an accident, wearout, or
other failure phenomenon will significantly degrade a required function. Estimates
of mean-time-between-failure, or accident/failure probability, are not accepted
as prima facie evidence to eliminate a particular requirement for maintenance.
Should the accident/failure probability be finite, the hardware is to be designed
for replacement if it is reasonable and practical to do so.
As a design objective, no routine or planned maintenance shall require use
of a pressure suit [either EVA or internal vehicular activity (IVA)] . Where
manual operations in a shirtsleeve environment are impractical, remote control
means of affecting such maintenance or repairs should be examined. However,
EVA (or pressure suit IVA) is allowable where no other solution is reasonable,
such as maintenance of external equipment.
Time dependency shall be eliminated as a factor of emergency action insofar
as it is reasonable and practical to do so. This includes all program aspects of
equipment, operations, and procedures which influence crew actions. When time
cannot be e-l-im-i-nated as a--factor of emergency action, a crew convenience period
of 5 minutes is established as the minimum objective. The purpose of the con-
venience period is to provide sufficient time for deliberate, prudent, and unhurried
action.
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7.1.2 ONBOARD MAINTENANCE FACILITY CONCEPTS
In addition to OCS/DMS capabilities, other onboard maintenance support
facilities provided on the Space Station include:
* Special tools for mission-survival contingency repairs such as soldering,
metal cutting, and drilling, as determined from contingency maintenance
analyses, although repairs of this type are not considered routine main-
tenance methods.
* Protective clothing or protective work areas for planned hazardous
maintenance tasks (such as those involving fuels, etc.).
* Automated maintenance procedures and stock location data for both
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair activities.
* Real-time ground communication of the detailed procedures, update
data, and procedures not carried onboard.
* Onboard cleanroom-type conditions by "glove box" facilities compatible
with the level at which this capability is found to be required.
* Maintenance support stockrooms or stowage facilities for spares
located in an area that provides for ease of inventory control and
ready accessibility to docking locations or transfer passages.
7.1.3 SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Space Station subsystems utilize modular concepts in design and emplace-
ment of subsystem elements. Subsystem modularity enhances man's ability to
maintain, repair, and replace elements of subsystems in orbit. Providing an
effective onboard repair capability is essential in supporting the Space Station's
ten-year life span since complete reliance on redundancy to achieve the long life
is not feasible. The need for a repair capability, in turn, requires that a mal-
function be isolated to at least its in-place remove-and-replace level. The level
of fault isolation is keyed to the LRU, which is the smallest modular unit suitable
for replacement. The identification of subsystem LRUs is addressed as a
separate, but interdependent, part of the Onboard Checkout Study.
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Specific subsystem maintenance concepts, of course, depend upon examina-
tion of the subsystems. These concepts are discussed in subsequent subparagraphs.
General subsystem-related maintenance guidelines that have been established for
the Space Station are:
* It is an objective to design so that EVA is not required. However, EVA
may be used to accomplish maintenance/repair when no other solution
is reasonable.
* Subsystems will be repaired in an in-place configuration at a level that
is acceptable for safety and handling, and that can be fault-isolated and
reverified by the integrated OCS/DMS. This level of maintenance is
referred to as line maintenance and the module replaced to effect the
repair is the LRU.
* A limited bench-level fault isolation capability will be provided on the
Space Station, but is only intended for contingency (recovery of lost
essential functions beyond the planned spares level) or for development
purposes. Limited bench-level support is also provided in the form
of standard measurement capabilities which are used primarily to
reduce the amount of special test equipment required.
* Subsystem elements, wherever practical, will be replaced only at
failure or wearout. Limited-life items that fail with time in a manner
that can be defined by analysis and test will be allowed to operate until
they have reached a predetermined level of deteriorated performance
prior to replacement. Where subsystem downtimes for replacement or
repair exceed desirable downtimes, the subsystem will include backup
(redundant) operational capability to permit maintenance. Expendable
items (filters, etc. ) will be replaced on a preplanned, scheduled basis.
7.2 ONBOARD ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (STUDY TASK 3)
The objective of this task was to generate recommendations of supporting
research and technology activities leading to implementation of a manned electron-
ics maintenance facility for the Space Station. Early in the task it became apparent
that attention could not be confined to a central maintenance facility; it was neces-
sary to refocus the task to address implementation of an on-board maintenance
capability encompassing in-place as well as centralized maintenance activities.
The critical questions are the following:
* What is the optimum allocation of onboard maintenance functions
between in-place and centralized maintenance facility locations?
7-3
e What is the optimum level of onboard repair (i. e., to line-replaceable
unit, subassembly or module, piece part, or circuit element)?
7.2.1 MAINTENANCE CYCLE
In order to place the task in the proper context, a generalized Space Station
electronic maintenance cycle is depicted in Figure 7-1.
A convenient place to enter the cycle is with detection of a fault ("In-Place
Maintenance" block). The fault is isolated to a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The
affected subsystem is restored to full capability by replacing the failed LRU with an
operable one from spares storage.
The failed LRU is taken to a maintenance facility (assumed for the moment
to have a fixed location in the Space Station) where it is first classified.as repair-
able or non-repairable. Classifications will likely be predetermined, and a listing
should be retained in the Data Management Subsystem. If the LRU is non-repairable,
it is placed in segregated storage. If the LRU is repairable on board, the fault is
further isolated to the failed Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA). The LRU is then
repaired by replacing the failed SRA with one from spares storage. The repaired
LRU is then calibrated (if necessary), and its operation verified before it is placed
in spares storage.
Logistics requirements (replacement LRUs and SRAs needed) are transmitted
to ground-based logistics support functions by RF communications and/or Space
Shuttle. Failed units are taken away from and replacement units are delivered to
the Space Station by the Space Shuttle.
7.2.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The study confirmed and emphasized the necessity of onboard maintenance for
any manned mission of any complexity and duration measured in months (up to 10
years for Space Station). Formulation of recommendations for implementing such
a capability required consideration of other topics first, and achievement of
certain interim results. The principal conclusions of this study task are sum-
marized below. The analyses leading to them are explained in the Task 3 Final
Report.
* Prior studies and developments of in-space maintenance have empha-
sized justification of first-level (in-place) maintenance, fasteners, and
tools for space application and human factors criteria. Much less
attention has been devoted to test equipment, maintenance training, or
definition of shop level maintenance requirements.
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Figure 7-1. Space Station Maintenance Cycle
* The baseline subsystem descriptions, checkout requirements analysis,
and software requirements analysis indicate that approximately 60 per-
cent of all faults (over a long period) can be isolated to the failed LRU
automatically under software control, without crew intervention. In an
additional 27 percent of failure cases, fault isolation to one LRU can be
achieved by the crew using the onboard Data Management System as a
tool. In the remaining failure cases, additional fault isolation capabili-
ties are needed. This is a good result for a "first iteration" and can
probably be improved considerably with a modest effort to modify stim-
ulus and measurement provisions.
* Crew involvement in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (including
participation in fault isolation)- is estimated to average 7.-2 manhours per
week over the total mission time. This estimate is most sensitive to
equipment reliability and levels at which onboard repair is performed.
It is affected little by the efficiency of automated fault isolation under
control of the Data Management Subsystem (DMS).
7-5
* The recommended approach to maintenance in the baseline Space Station
is in-place removal and replacement of LRUs, without attempts to repair
LRUs onboard, if the resupply interval is less than nine months. Onboard
spares should be LRUs.
· For long resupply intervals or non-resupplied missions (as in a manned
interplanetary mission), in-place maintenance should be by removal and
replacement of LRUs. Repair of LRUs should be by removal and replace-
ment of Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs). Onboard spares should be
SRAs.
* The Earth-orbital Space Station should include provision for development
of onboard maintenance capability and techniques applicable to long dura-
tion non-resupplied missions and/or the larger, more complex Space
Base.
* The baseline subsystem descriptions are at such a level of detail that
precise specification of onboard tools and test equipment is neither
feasible nor desirable. Anticipated needs identified qualitatively in the
study are: (1) a portable test module to supplement software fault isola-
tion as well as to assist mechanical adjustments and calibrator, (2) hand
tools for removal and replacement of electronic assemblies, (3) devices
for transporting and positioning spare assemblies, and (4) a central
maintenance/repair bench.
* Several tasks have been identified and recommended for future perfor-
mance, as part of a system study/design program or as separate
supporting research and technology tasks. The principal ones deal with
(1) development of a portable test assembly, (2) development of a repair/
test bench with special provisions for small parts retention and for de-
bris collection, (3) design for accessibility of test points and subassem-
blies, and (4) devices for transporting equipment within the Space Station.
The foregoing conclusions apply to the Modular Space Station as well as the
33-foot diameter, four-deck configuration.
The results of the study rest upon several assumptions and estimates,
derived wherever possible from related experience. The results are not sensitive
to small variations of the assumed or estimated values, except for equipment fail-
ure rates, which are most influential. Furthermore, it has not been practicable to
pursue all trade analyses to include all relevant factors. Nevertheless, the study
has generated valid insights into Space Station onboard maintenance and useful
visibility of the path to implementation of that capability.
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